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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional principles and doctrines, whether structural (e.g., 
federalism,1 separation of powers2) or rights-based (e.g., due process3), provide 
various safeguards against unwarranted uses of government powers applied to 
the detriment of citizens.4 The constitutional doctrine of preemption serves a 
similar role. Whether ensconced in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution or arising from state sovereign powers, preemption refers to how 
laws at lower levels of government may be altered or negated by conflicting 
laws at higher levels.5 Federal laws may expressly or impliedly6 preempt state 
                                                                                                                     
1 Federalism divides powers between federal and state governments to promote 
political accountability in furtherance of individual freedoms. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t was the insight of the 
Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of the two governments, not one.”); 
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 111 (3d ed. 2016) (“The [Chief Justice] Roberts Court appears less focused on 
protecting states’ rights for their own sake, preferring instead to police the constitutional 
design in ways that protect individual liberty.”); see also DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, PART I 46 (1997) (“The hope for American federalism’s
divided delegation of sovereignty was that, in a manner similar to the separation of powers 
in the federal government, levels of government with opposing interests would check one 
another and thus prevent any one level from becoming dangerously powerful.”).
2 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513, 1513 (1991) (“The principle of separated powers is a prominent feature of the 
body of the Constitution, dictating the form, function, and structure of a government of 
limited powers.”).
3 Substantive and procedural due process principles limit government overreaching in 
multiple settings. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE 
LAW 124–29 (2009).
4 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 100 (1987) (“The 
Constitution creates the structure of government, in part, to prevent those in power from 
increasing their authority.”); GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 1, at 83 (“The constitutional 
design, then, is one in which government is afforded ample power to safeguard the 
commonweal but is prohibited from exercising it to trample individual rights.”); see also
Brown, supra note 2, at 1514 (“[T]he structure of the government is a vital part of a 
constitutional organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights.”).
5 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Alicia Corbett, Legal Preemption and the Prevention of 
Chronic Conditions, 13 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE (June 30, 2016), https://www.cdc.
gov/pcd/issues/2016/16_0121.htm [https://perma.cc/L3MQ-WYGR].
6 The focus of this commentary is on the general meaning and basis for the 
constitutional doctrine of preemption, and not its manifestations in express or implied forms. 
Preemption analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court is “anything but analytically air-tight.”
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed. 2000). To the extent 
these issues delve into the deeper realms of preemption analyses or conflicts of laws 
principles, they are not addressed substantively despite their potential relevance.
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or local laws because federal law is supreme. State laws can preempt local laws 
because local governments are lawfully controlled by their sovereign states.7
A major premise of the doctrine of preemption arising from the Supremacy 
Clause is the preservation of continuity among tri-levels of government in the 
United States in furtherance of political order and stability.8 While this facet of 
preemption underscores its utility as a structural principle, various applications 
of preemption (e.g., floor, ceiling, field) are highly complex, especially in inter-
jurisdictional fields like public health law.9
Preemption is a double-edged sword capable of promoting or limiting state 
or local public health objectives. Federal preemption may be used to create a 
national baseline standard for public health policies (e.g., menu labeling 
provisions10) that would not otherwise exist across all states.11 Alternatively, 
preemption can thwart state or local public health legal innovations in diverse 
areas such as gun control, tobacco use, food policy, employment protection, and 
the environment.12 Though frustrating to policymakers, preemptive limits are a 
lawful consequence of the constitutional doctrine.13
However, emerging “preemption plus(+)” tactics reveal a darker policy 
realm. Law and policy-makers increasingly seek to control lower-level
governments through actions exceeding traditional boundaries or specific 
targets of preemption. Preemption+ schemes include lawmakers’ efforts to tack 
on direct threats, fines, loss of funds, and broad de-authorizations of powers to 
traditional preemption clauses or provisions. These tactics are prominent in 
public health areas impacting large industries (e.g., tobacco and sugar sweetened 
beverages (SSBs)) and specific interests (e.g., rights to bear arms and religious 
freedom). The impetus is to essentially force states or localities to comply with 
higher level policies often antithetical to the public’s health.
Our exploration of preemption+ examines its historic and modern 
applications at federal and state levels as well as political and judicial arguments 
to limit negative impacts on public health policy. Though it has emerged as an 
oppressive obstacle to public health innovation, the roots of preemption+ are 
embedded in constitutional precepts and long-standing policies. Modern 
                                                                                                                     
7 Even some local governments with sufficient state-delegated authority may preempt 
laws among lesser municipalities. See Andrew Selsky, Oregon County Says No to Nestle 
Water-Bottling Plant, SEATTLE TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/bus
iness/oregon-county-says-no-to-nestle-water-bottling-plant/ [https://perma.cc/7BSF-VTR7]
(explaining how Oregon county law overrode city law approving manufacturing plant within 
the county’s borders).
8 Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1422 (2008).
9 GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 1, at 78 (“The taxonomy of preemption is complex.”).
10 JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 213–17 (2d ed. 2016).
11 Mark Pertschuk et al., Assessing the Impact of Federal and State Preemption in 
Public Health: A Framework for Decision Makers, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 213, 
214 (2012).
12 Id. at 213.
13 See id. at 216.
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expressions of preemption+, however, arguably exceed these core foundations, 
leading to an array of contemporary legal challenges. To counter the trend, state 
and local public health officials have engaged in political grassroots efforts and 
brought multiple lawsuits with varying degrees of success. 
Defeating preemption+ tactics is obfuscated, particularly among local 
governments, by the constitutional entrenchment of the underlying doctrine.
Enhanced understanding of the cohesiveness of structural and rights-based 
principles may provide alternative arguments to stem the tide of these schemes 
and open greater pathways to public health legal innovations.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF PREEMPTION
While federal, state, and local governments often concurrently address 
shared public health concerns, inter-jurisdictional conflicts are controlled by 
principles of preemption emanating from allocations of powers among federal, 
state, and local governments.14 Constitutionally enumerated federal powers are 
limited but supreme.15 Federal entities may expressly or impliedly curtail state 
and municipal laws.16 Consistent with principles of federalism, states are 
reserved police and parens patriae powers as sovereign governments via the 
Tenth Amendment.17 Unlike federal authorities, states are not constrained in 
their dominance over local governments (absent state constitutional limits) 
because localities owe their existence to states.18 As a result, states may preempt 
local laws almost at will. 
The politics, promises, and perils of preemption oscillate over time. Federal 
and state governments can use preemption to strengthen public health by 
authorizing lower levels of government to build upon national or state minimum 
standards.19 However, preemption is more commonly used to override or limit 
local authority.20 More aggressive schemes have their roots in centuries-old 
policies. In the nineteenth century, state “ripper laws” arbitrarily stripped local 
powers from municipalities.21 In response to public outcry, forty-one states 
enacted state constitutional amendments forbidding these punitive laws (unless 
requested by local government).22
                                                                                                                     
14 Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Mark Pertschuk, State Preemption: A Significant and Quiet 
Threat to Public Health in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 900, 900 (2017).
15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
16 See Pertschuk et al., supra note 11, at 214.
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18 Pomeranz & Pertschuk, supra note 14, at 900.
19 For example, the National School Lunch Act of 1946, ch. 281, 79 Pub. L. No. 396, 
60 Stat. 230, 233, sets minimum nutritional standards that benefit all schoolchildren and 
empowers lower levels of government to enact or enforce additional measures. See Pomeranz 
& Pertschuk, supra note 14, at 900.
20 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF 
NATIONAL POWER 165–67 (2d ed. 2008).
21 Id. at 166.
22 Id.
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Sparse federal laws early in the nation’s history led to few conflicts 
requiring preemptive overrides of state or local laws.23 By the turn of the 
century, Congress had taken initial steps toward increased regulation with 
preemptive effects. In furtherance of national uniformity, Congress passed the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 to strip states of their existing authorities to 
regulate the railroad industry.24 In the 1930s, a rush of New Deal regulations, 
undergirded primarily by Congress’ interstate commerce authority, greatly 
expanded the federal government’s activities and presence.25 Inconsistent state 
and local laws were dismissed to advance national goals and stability. Supported 
by major industries, multiple variations of preemption (illustrated in Figure 1) 
were used to block or override conflicting laws at lower levels.26
Figure 1: Preemption Variations
FLOOR CEILING FIELD




Federal or state 
law establishes a 
minimum standard 
that lower levels may 
not go below but can 
surpass
Federal or state 
law sets maximum 
protections that lower 
levels may not 
exceed
Federal or state 
law “occupies a 
field,”
disempowering lower 
levels from acting in 
the same domain
Profound implications of preemption on public health law arose. State and 
local governments have tailored public health policies to meet the needs of their 
constituencies. Local innovations often serve as models for other localities as 
well as state and federal entities. Yet, higher levels of government increasingly 
wield preemption to deter local public health policies by restricting or curbing 
                                                                                                                     
23 Early in the history of the country, it was more common for states to attempt to 
infringe on federal powers. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 328–29 (1819).
(holding unconstitutional a Maryland law taxing notes produced by the Bank of the United 
States); see also JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:
LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION 5–6 (2006). 
24 Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49-41, 49 Stat. 379 (1887). 
25 See Forrest Revere Black, The Commerce Clause and the New Deal, 20 CORNELL 
L.Q. 169, 169 (1935).
26 Pertschuk et al., supra note 11, at 213.
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lower level public health laws without providing meaningful alternatives or 
extinguishing local innovations and protections altogether.27 In 2013, despite 
having the highest adult obesity prevalence among all states,28 Mississippi 
prohibited local restrictions on food and beverages akin to New York City’s
SSB portion size proposal.29 In 2014, Tennessee became the twelfth state to 
limit or eliminate local smoke-free laws.30 In 2017, ordinances partially 
decriminalizing marijuana in Nashville and Memphis were nullified by state 
drug control legislation.31
Successful challenges to federal and state preemption are difficult, but 
localities may prevail legally32 by demonstrating that a preemptive law (1) 
violates individual rights,33 (2) has a purpose distinct from local law, or (3) 
infringes on the municipality’s ability to govern local matters.34 In 1992, against 
a backdrop of municipal laws banning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in health services and other areas, Colorado amended its state 
constitution to bar local laws (and other government actions) recognizing gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual individuals as a protected class.35 The U.S. Supreme Court 
found the amendment violated Equal Protection principles.36 In 2015, the Los
                                                                                                                     
27 Pomeranz & Pertschuk, supra note 14, at 901–02.
28 The State of Obesity: Better Policies for a Healthier America, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND. (Sept. 2014) https://www.stateofobesity.org/files/stateofobesity2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6AY-55WM].
29 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-29-901(2) (West 2013); see Bruce Yee, 5 More Locations 
Pass Soda Taxes: What’s Next for Big Soda, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/brucelee/2016/11/14/5-more-locations-pass-soda-taxes-whats-next-for-bigsoda/#
27e5e33aed19 [https://perma.cc/XT4H-CACS] (explaining that several other states and local 
governments have introduced laws aimed at curbing SSB consumption). 
30 Preemption Watch: Smokefree, GRASSROOTS CHANGE, https://grassrootschange.net/
preemption-watch/#/category/smokefree [https://perma.cc/MN3Q-E7YN]. 
31 Joey Garrison, Bill Haslam Signs Repeal of New Nashville, Memphis Marijuana 
Laws, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/04/13/bill
-haslam-signs-repeal-new-nashville-memphis-marijuana-laws/100416186/[https://perma.cc
/FGX5-XPPF].
32 Nonlegal solutions can also negate preemptive impacts. In 2011, Seattle introduced 
de facto decriminalization of certain drug possession violations through its “Law 
Enforcement Assisted Diversion” (LEAD) program. Rather than criminalizing individuals 
violating drug possession laws, police direct them to drug treatment, harm reduction, and 
other supportive services to reduce stigma, incarceration, and barriers to care. An initial 
evaluation showed that LEAD reduces the number of people who are arrested, prosecuted, 
and incarcerated, as well as levels of recidivism. See, e.g., DRUG POLICY ALL., IT’S TIME FOR
THE U.S. TO DECRIMINALIZE DRUG USE AND POSSESSION 19 (July 2017).
33 Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364–
65 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Political subdivisions only have standing to 
challenge state statutes on constitutional grounds in certain jurisdictions. See id. at 1363
(holding that local government, as a political subdivision of the state, lacked standing under 
federal law to challenge state law).
34 See infra Part III.
35 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
36 Id. at 635.
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Angeles City Council approved a ban on alcohol advertisements on city property 
to reduce underage drinking and alcohol abuse.37 The ordinance survived a 
preemption challenge because its purpose was to address alcohol marketing 
rather than state-regulated alcohol sales.38
III. PUBLIC HEALTH PREEMPTION+
Preemption+ strategies involving enhanced punishments or disincentives 
frequently accompany state or federal laws targeting public health efforts.39
Figure 2 illustrates how these strategies threaten local public health efforts in 
diverse areas including gun control, tobacco use, food policy, and employee and 
environmental protections.
Figure 2: Preemption+ Tactics40
A. Preemption+ Trends
Multiple states supplement preemptive laws with provisions penalizing 
local officials who enforce or enact contrary ordinances or other laws. A 2011 
                                                                                                                     
37 Soumya Karlamangla, Council Votes to Ban Alcoholic Beverage Ads on Most City 
Property, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
alcohol-ad-ban-20150120-story.html [https://perma.cc/A83T-GQKU].
38 Molly Cohen, A Lawyer’s Playbook to Fight State Preemption, CITYLAB (July 19, 
2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/a-lawyers-playbook-to-fight-state-preemp
tion/533862/ [https://perma.cc/WF7S-M8PP].
39 James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health “Preemption Plus,” 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
156, 156 (2017).
40 Id. at 157.
Texas S.B. 4 imposes fines 
on non-complying local 
officials in sanctuary cities
Michigan H.B. 4795 allows 
lawsuits against local 
officials who fail to remove 
preempted gun control 
ordinances
Arizona S.B. 1487 
authorizes withholding of 
funds from non-complying 
localities 
Texas S.B. 40 denies all 
local regulations of oil and 
gas in response to local 
fracking ban
692 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:4
firearm preemption statute in Florida penalizes local officials with fines up to 
$5,000, loss of governmental immunity, and possible removal from office or 
employment by the Governor.41 Florida Carry, a pro-gun nonprofit, brought 
numerous lawsuits under the statute, including one against the City of 
Tallahassee and its mayor in 2017.42 In 2012, Kentucky43 and Mississippi44 also 
amended their firearm preemption statutes to impose criminal or other penalties 
on local officials. In 2016 and 2017, legislatures in five more states proffered 
additional bills to punish local officials for enacting preempted ordinances.45
Backed by pro-gun industries and advocates, multiple state legislators 
support gun-related preemption+ legislation even harsher than the Florida law.46
Introduced in 2015, Michigan H.B. 4795 (1) allots a ninety-day time period for 
municipalities to repeal any preempted gun control ordinances; (2) allows the 
state attorney general or private individuals to sue non-compliant local officials; 
and (3) makes local government agencies accountable for all associated legal 
costs and fines.47 Although the bill ultimately failed,48 it reveals the potential 
preemption+ challenges local jurisdictions face in seeking to advance gun 
control measures that promote the public’s health. 
Funding withdrawals are a prodigious leverage tool for higher levels of 
government to militate lower-level compliance. President Donald Trump’s
Executive Order 13768 threatens to defund local jurisdictions espousing 
“sanctuary city” status in violation of federal and state immigration laws.49 State 
legislatures have introduced over eighty anti-sanctuary city bills, including 
North Carolina’s version that threatens to suppress state funding.50 The 
                                                                                                                     
41 FLA. STAT. § 790.33(3)(a)–(f) (West 2017).
42 Julie Montanaro & Mariel Carbone, Appellate Court Rejects Lawsuit Filed Against 
City of Tallahassee, WCTV (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Tallahassee-
leaders-in-court-over-gun-suit--410281715.html [https://perma.cc/RBN5-9YEC] (court 
refusing to implement penalties authorized by the statute since the ordinances had not been 
enforced).
43 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870(6) (LexisNexis 2014).
44 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 45-9-53(5)(c) (West Supp. 2017).




47 H.B. 4795, 2015 Legis. Sess. (Mich. 2015); Penalties for Local Limitations on Gun 
Ownership, MICH. HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY 2 (May 2016), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/
documents/2015-2016/billanalysis/House/pdf/2015-HLA-4795-7FFE2B32.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST64-AYMH]. 
48 Another NRA Defeat: Gun-Lobby Backed Bills Fail in Michigan Legislature,
EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Dec. 16, 2016), https://everytown.org/press/another-nra-
defeat-gun-lobby-backed-bills-fail-in-michigan-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/48YU-S3H6].
49 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
50 Catherine E. Shoichet, These States Have Banned Sanctuary Cities, CNN (May 8, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/08/politics/sanctuary-city-state-bans/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2R7U-28KQ].
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Department of Justice has clarified it will enforce federal controlled substances 
laws in states with legalized marijuana.51
A 2016 Arizona law presents the penultimate preemption+ penalty against 
localities. As explained further in Figure 2, S.B. 1487 authorizes the state 
attorney general to investigate any local action allegedly preempted by state law, 
and withhold all state funds from localities found in violation.52 The threat of 
losing revenue for essential government activities (e.g., fire and rescue services, 
law enforcement, sanitation) stymied local public health initiatives in the state.53
Efforts in the City of Tempe to mandate paid sick and safe time for all 
employees were chilled in 2016.54 The City of Bisbee’s plastic bag ordinance 
was similarly targeted that same year.55 Tucson faced losing over $115 million 
in state funds for refusing to comply with a state firearm ordinance.56
Sweeping removals of local regulatory or home rule authority proliferate 
across multiple public health areas, including nutrition-based regulation. Many 
localities across the United States are enacting innovative legal approaches to 
improve community nutritional standards by banning toys from kids’ fast food 
meals, placing warning labels on SSB products and advertisements, and 
requiring labeling of high-sodium foods on restaurant menus.57 In 2007, 
however, the Ohio legislature preempted nearly all local regulation of public 
health nutrition.58 Kansas’s 2016 preemption statute broadly precludes local 
regulation and oversight of food service operations, retail food establishments, 
                                                                                                                     
51 Memorandum from Jeffrey B. Sessions, III, Attorney General, on Marijuana 
Enforcement to All United States Attorneys (Jan. 4, 2018); see also Sadie Gurman, Sessions: 
US Prosecutors Won’t Take on Small-Time Pot Cases US NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2018),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2018-03-10/sessions-us-prosecutors-wont-
take-on-small-time-pot-cases (last visited Aug 6, 2018).
52 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01(A) (Supp. 2017).
53 Pomeranz & Pertschuk, supra note 15, at 902.
54 Chris Coppola, State Threat Prompts Tempe Council to Drop Sick Leave Proposal, 
ARIZ. CENT. (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/tempe/2016/02/27/
state-threat-prompts-tempe-council-drop-sick-leave-proposal/80712240/ [https://perma.cc/
GZ6C-R5W5].
55 Alia Beard Rau, State Senator Goes After Bisbee’s Plastic-Bags Ordinance, ARIZ.
CENT. (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2016/08/11/
state-senator-goes-after-bisbees-plastic-bags-ordinance/88544678/ [https://perma.cc/3WCJ-
EV7R].
56 Joe Ferguson & Howard Fischer, Tucson and State Will Square off in Court over Gun 
Laws and Local Control, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Dec. 6, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/local
/govt-and-politics/tucson-and-state-will-square-off-in-court-over-gun/article_37240e41-
d340-55d2-ac74-a6755f7733a0.html [https://perma.cc/X4BV-MEH2].
57 Healthy Eating, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., MITCHELL HAMLINE SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/healthy-eating [https://perma.cc/B38P-4WJ3]; 
State Laws Related to Dietary Sodium, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/analysis-of-state-laws-related-to-dietary-sodium.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VMF4-SM34].
58 See State Policy: Preemption, THE STATE OF OBESITY, https://stateofobesity.org/
state-policy/policies/preempt/ [https://perma.cc/ZP37-VD8R].
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and other local food practices.59 As of 2018, twelve states preempt localities 
from regulating on an extensive range of nutrition-based regulation.60
B. Texas Preemption+ Strategies
Over the past several years, the Texas legislature has attempted multifarious 
efforts to preempt local regulatory authority in response to policies that clash 
with state interests. Though not all of Texas’ preemption+ proposals have 
succeeded, they demonstrate the cumulative potential for supplemental tactics 
to stifle public health innovation.
Similar to strategies in Florida and Michigan,61 a 2015 Texas statute bars 
local governments from excluding licensed gun holders from carrying concealed 
firearms on government property (except where prohibited by state law).62
Individuals alleging harm via a preempted local action may file a complaint with 
the Texas attorney general, who may subsequently sue the local agency or 
subdivision to terminate the offense and collect civil penalties.63
In 2015, the City of Austin passed an ordinance requiring ride-share drivers 
to complete fingerprint background checks in the interest of public safety.64
Concerned that ride-share companies may leave the state,65 H.B. 10066 was 
enacted to strip local governments of any authority to regulate ride-sharing. 
After the City of Denton banned fracking, the 2015 Texas legislature could have 
simply preempted localities from regulating fracking. Instead, it enacted H.B. 
40 to declare the state’s exclusive and broad authority to regulate all oil and gas 
operations.67 In the same legislative session, H.B. 540 was introduced to 
prohibit adoption of local laws on nearly any issue.68 Although the bill died in 
committee,69 this and other “blanket preemption” proposals send a strong 
message to localities that their long-standing public health authorities are at risk. 
                                                                                                                     
59 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12.16.137 (West 2017).
60 Preemption Watch, supra note 30.
61 See infra Part IV.A. 
62 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.209 (West Supp. 2015).
63 Id.
64 Ben Wear, Austin Council OKs Fingerprint Requirement for Ride-Hailing Drivers,
STATESMAN (Dec. 18, 2015) https://www.statesman.com/news/local/austin-council-oks-
fingerprint-requirement-for-ride-hailing-drivers/qv965Fve5Hh19IfZ8HaJGO/
[https://perma.cc/X8M5-D6Y7].
65 See Alex Samuels, Uber, Lyft Return to Austin as Texas Gov. Abbott Signs Ride-
Hailing Measure into Law, TEX. TRIB. (May 29, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/05/29/texas-gov-greg-abbott-signs-measure-creating-statewide-regulations-rid/
[https://perma.cc/3PDL-PDZ7].
66 H.B. 100, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) codified as TEX. OCC. CODE § 2402
(2017).
67 H.B. 40, 84th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) codified as TEX. OCC. CODE § 81 (2015).
68 H.B. 540, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
69 See id.
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In 2017, the Texas legislature introduced S.B. 6 to preempt all local anti-
discrimination ordinances allowing transgender individuals to use public 
bathrooms aligned with their gender identity.70 The bill proposed penalizing 
schools or governmental entities that refuse to regulate bathrooms based on the 
sex listed on individuals’ birth certificates.71 The legislature passed S.B. 4 the 
same year to ban municipalities from adopting policies limiting immigration 
enforcement.72 The statute subjects local law enforcement and other officials to 
misdemeanor charges for failing to cooperate with federal and state preemptive 
immigration authorities.73
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO PREEMPTION+
Preemption+ tactics can be perverse, but municipalities are fighting back 
through (1) grassroots movements pushing for anti-preemption legislation or 
ballot initiatives; (2) litigation challenging the constitutionality of preemption+
efforts on state and federal levels; and (3) invocation of home rule provisions in 
some state constitutions or statutes.
A. Grassroots Movements
Local officials, legal scholars, and community members are politically 
resisting industry-led preemption+ schemes. In September 2017, over 500 city 
officials in Florida conferenced to brainstorm anti-preemption efforts.74 They 
proposed requiring state lobbyists to disclose whether clients have promoted 
preemption, educating voters and stakeholders on the value of local autonomy, 
and holding industries accountable by identifying corporations that rely on 
preemption+ strategies. 
Municipalities may bolster constitutional or statutory home rule authority 
by advancing legislation on matters within local control.75 Researchers with the 
Legal Effort to Address Preemption (LEAP) project are developing model 
language to insert in home rule legislation.76 In addition, laws featuring explicit 
non-preemptive language can hamper preemption+ strategies. Kansas’s Indoor 
                                                                                                                     
70 S.B. 6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
71 Id.
72 S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
73 Id.
74 Joe Kefauver, Revenge of the Cities, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://csnews.com/revenge-cities [https://perma.cc/BY7C-QRFH]. 
75 Legal Strategies to Counter State Preemption and Protect Progressive Localism: A 
Summary of the Findings of the Legal Effort to Address Preemption (LEAP) Project, (May
2017), BETTER BALANCE 1, 5 (May 2017), http://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/Summary-of-LEAP-Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MJL- A7TM].
76 Id. at 3.
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Clean Air Act explicitly allows more stringent local laws relating to indoor 
smoking.77
State legislatures can also repeal preemptive laws via statute or ballot 
initiatives. The 2002 Delaware Clean Air Act repealed state-wide tobacco 
control preemption provisions and expanded smoke-free regulations.78
Connecticut introduced a similar bill in 2017 to remove language preempting 
municipal smoking restrictions.79 North Carolina repealed portions of its 
“bathroom bill” (similar to Texas’ Senate Bill 6) to allow local regulation on 
anti-discrimination measures.80 Repeals of expressly preemptive state law may 
not be fully effective because field preemption may be presumed by some states’
courts whenever the state extensively regulates.81 Thus, explicit non-preemption 
language may better protect local home rule.
B. Constitutional Arguments
Municipalities are judicially challenging preemption+ on procedural and 
substantive grounds. In Leach v. Commonwealth, a Pennsylvania firearm 
preemption statute was invalidated solely because it violated the 
Commonwealth’s single-subject rule.82 More commonly, however, 
municipalities’ arguments against preemption+ fixate on purported violations of 
federalism, separation of powers, due process, or equal protection.
                                                                                                                     
77 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6114 (West 2012) (“Nothing in this act shall prevent any city 
or county from regulating smoking within its boundaries, so long as such regulation is at 
least as stringent as that imposed by this act. In such cases the more stringent local regulation 
shall control to the extent of any inconsistency between such regulation and this act.”). 
78 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2901–2908 (2002).
79 Connecticut’s preemptive smoking law states “[t]he provisions of this section shall 
supersede and preempt the provisions of any municipal law or ordinance relative to smoking 
effective prior to, on or after October 1, 1993.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-342 (2011). The 
bill introduced in 2017 seeks to strike this language completely. See Raised B. 7089, 2017 
Gen. Assemb., 2017 Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017) https://www.cga.ct.gov/2017/TOB/h/pdf/2017
HB-07089-R00-HB.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KQ-MYFQ].
80 Camila Domonoske & James Doubek, North Carolina Repeals Portions of 
Controversial ‘Bathroom Bill,’ NPR (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/03/30/522009335/north-carolina-lawmakers-governor-announce-compromise-
to-repeal-bathroom-bill [https://perma.cc/J8DJ-YAEZ].
81 Repealing Preemption and Advancing Non-Preemption Language in State Law: 
Examples, A BETTER BALANCE, 1, 2 (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.abetterbalance.org/
resources/repealing-preemption-and-advancing-non-preemption-language-in-state-law-
examples/ [https://perma.cc/Q3U5-DQYX].
82 Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 435 (Pa. 2016) (holding that a statute 
providing penalties for theft of secondary materials as well as standing for organizations
seeking to challenge municipal firearm legislation violated Pennsylvania’s single-subject 
rule).
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As noted in Part II, in 2017, Florida Carry argued that Florida’s field-
occupying gun statute preempted a Tallahassee ordinance.83 The City of 
Tallahassee counterclaimed that the state statute, specifically its penalty 
provision,84 unconstitutionally violated absolute legislative immunity and 
freedom of speech.85 The court held that the City of Tallahassee had not violated 
the State’s preemption statute because the ordinance was unenforced. However, 
the court refused to address Tallahassee’s cross claim because no officials 
actually suffered statutory penalties.86 The City won, but its victory was shallow 
as Florida’s preemption+ gun law remains intact.
Several municipalities have contested state and federal preemption+ tactics 
involving sanctuary cities.87 Two judges upheld injunctions against President 
Trump’s aforementioned executive order. In City of Chicago v. Sessions (2017), 
a court held the order at issue violated separation of powers principles by 
attempting to impose conditions on funds without sufficient congressional 
approval.88 Similarly, in County of Santa Clara v. Trump (2017), Santa Clara 
County and the City and County of San Francisco challenged the order as 
unconstitutionally vague, commandeering, and contrary to principles of 
separation of powers and procedural due process.89 The court granted the 
municipalities’ injunction based on separation of powers violations and 
deprivation of municipal rights under the Tenth90 and Fifth Amendments.91
When the City of El Paso sued to enjoin enforcement of Texas’ anti-sanctuary 
                                                                                                                     
83 See Fla. Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2017). 
84 FLA. STAT. § 790.33 (2017) (“Any person, county, agency, municipality, district, or 
other entity that violates the Legislature’s occupation of the whole field of regulation of 
firearms and ammunition . . . by enacting or causing to be enforced any local ordinance or 
administrative rule or regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of the field shall 
be liable as set forth herein . . . If the court determines that a violation was knowing and 
willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed 
local government official . . . public funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the 
unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly and willfully violated this 
section.”). 
85 Fla. Carry, 212 So. 3d at 455.
86 Id. at 466.
87 Suzannah Gonzales et al., U.S. Judge Sides Against Trump in Fight Over ‘Sanctuary 
Cities,’ REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
sanctuary/u-s-judge-sides-against-trump-in-fight-over-sanctuary-cities-idUSKCN1BQ2VL
[https://perma.cc/R4K4-VVSD].
88 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 250 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
89 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
90 In attempting to “conscript states and local jurisdictions into carrying out federal 
immigration law.” Id. at 533. 
91 In that the executive order is “unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause” and “fails to provide [the Counties] with procedural due 
process.” Id. at 534 36. 
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city bill, the federal court temporarily blocked its provisions on grounds that the 
provisions preempted federal law or were otherwise unconstitutional.92
C. Home Rule
Municipalities may also question preemption+ tactics as contrary to state 
constitutional or statutory home rule rights as highlighted in State ex rel. 
Brnovich v. City of Tucson.93 At the source of the challenge in Brnovich is the 
aforementioned legislative scheme embedded in Arizona Senate Bill 1487 and 
illustrated in Figure 3.94
Figure 3: Brnovich Preemption+ Statutory Framework
In Brnovich, the Arizona attorney general investigated a Tucson gun 
disposal ordinance and submitted a special action to the Arizona Supreme 
Court.95 The City of Tucson challenged the action and Senate Bill 1487, arguing 
                                                                                                                     
92 Federal Judge Blocks Texas’ Tough ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Law, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/31/federal-judge-blocks-texas-tough-sanctuary-cities-
law.html [https://perma.cc/3G9D-TB7C]. A provision barring local officials from adopting, 
enforcing, or endorsing “any policy limiting the enforcement of immigration laws” was 
enjoined on the premise it could violate First Amendment principles and substantive due 
process by failing to define specific, prohibited conduct. Manny Fernandez, Federal Judge 
Blocks Texas’ Ban on ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/08/30/us/judge-texas-sanctuary-cities.html [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal].
93 See State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P. 3d 663, 673 (Ariz. 2017). 
94 Id. at 667 68.
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that the law violated separation of powers principles96 and infringed Tucson’s
home rule authority.97 The State of Arizona responded that it (1) had lawfully 
preempted the City of Tucson;98 and (2) its actions furthered state interests in 
protecting citizens’ Second Amendment rights to bear arms.99
In August 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the statute against 
Tucson’s objections.100 The court whisked aside separation of powers principles 
given the discretionary role of the attorney general to make legal judgments 
within the statute’s framework.101 Tucson’s home rule argument was dismissed 
on grounds that the local regulation involved matters of state concern (e.g., 
police departments, firearms, and city budgets).102 Arizona’s constitution only 
grants home rule powers to charter cities like Tucson subject to the greater 
powers of the state.103 When conflicts arise, state law wins unless a matter is 
purely of a local concern.104 To retain its state funds, the City Council of Tucson 
repealed its gun disposal ordinance in September 2017.105
V. PREEMPTION+ AND CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION
Preemption+ tactics present arduous political and legal challenges for local 
governments. From a political perspective, combatting higher-level 
governments over policies couched in preemption terms is difficult.106 Federal 
                                                                                                                     
96 Id. at 668 (arguing the statute violates separation of powers because a single member 
of the legislature can request the attorney general to perform special investigations, and then 
the attorney general can file a special action if she or he finds cause).
97 See id. at 673. The City also raised a procedural due process argument against the 
statute’s bond requirement, but the court did not address the argument since the City was not 
required to post the bond. Id. at 671.
98 See Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 673 (arguing that firearms are a matter of statewide 
concern).
99 Id. at 676.
100 Id. at 679.
101 See id. at 668–69 (holding that there is no violation of separation of powers principles 
because the attorney general’s inherent discretion does not usurp judicial authority).
102 See id. at 676.
103 See id. at 675 (holding that even a charter city cannot encroach on matters of 
statewide concern; it must only be a local issue).
104 See Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 676.
105 Arizona: Tucson Repeals Ordinance Requiring Destruction of Firearms, NRA-ILA 




106 See, e.g., Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 39, at 156–57 (2017) (describing the political 
threats such as loss in funding, fines for violators of preemption, and loss of regulatory 
authority).
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supremacy107 and sovereign police powers tend to override local policies.108
When intractable conflicts arise, the presumption of preemption is that higher 
levels of government usually prevail.109 Municipalities can still wage political 
battles with state or federal governments, but the odds of success can be long 
when resources and authorities are slim.
Outside the political realm, judicial challenges of preemption+ are dicey. 
Municipalities and courts struggle to separate and assess key distinctions 
between constitutionally-grounded facets of preemption and accompanying plus
tactics. Failure to distinguish between these issues is a death knell for most 
disputes. When preemption is viewed as the foundation of plus strategies, local 
governments’ objections hinging on pure preemption fall flat so long as higher 
levels of government are justified in their exercise of authority.110 Thus, as the 
Arizona Supreme Court determined in Brnovich, the premise that the State was 
acting within the gambit of its sovereign powers was sufficient to justify 
virtually all exercises impacting local governments, including those that 
arguably exceed the boundaries of preemption.111
To prevail localities must pivot away from arguing whether federal or state 
governments can preempt local laws to explore whether distinct exercises of 
preemption+ are constitutionally sound.112 This requires localities and courts to 
untangle exercises of preemption from plus strategies to separately assess the 
nature of a higher government’s authority. Tucson attempted this approach in 
arguing that the Arizona state legislature’s preemptive scheme intruded on 
constitutionally-vested local home rule powers.113 The argument was crafty, but 
the City still lost.114
Ultimately at the source of Tucson’s and other localities’ defeats may be a 
failure to recognize the interrelatedness of constitutional structural and rights-
based principles. Tucson essentially fought fire with fire. It challenged the 
structural principle of preemption through competing structural principles of 
local home rule authority.115 Tucson’s argument missed the mark in three 
                                                                                                                     
107 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that to the extent 
that state or local exercises of powers “[interference] with, or are contrary to the law of 
Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, . . . [i]n every such case, the act of 
Congress . . . is supreme,” and sub-level governmental exercises “must yield to it.”).
108 E.g., Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 676 (holding that the broad police powers of the state 
make firearms a statewide concern).
109 Contra Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1604, 1607 (2007). 
110 See, e.g., Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 678 (provided the state shows some statewide 
concern the preemption statute stands).
111 See id. at 675 77.
112 See Hodge, Jr., supra note 39, at 158–59 (discussing various successful challenges 
to preemption lawsuits).
113 Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 673.
114 Id. at 679.
115 See id. at 673.
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primary ways by (1) failing to unravel the preemptive and non-preemptive facets
of the underlying state; (2) wrongly purporting that preemptive exercises of state 
sovereign police powers must succumb to local home rule; and (3) opting 
against a potential stealthier option aligned with long-standing constitutional 
theory.
Under principles of constitutional cohesion,116 to the extent structural- and 
rights-based principles are interwoven within the fabric of federal or state 
constitutions, they are interdependent and subject to predictable 
interpretations.117 Stated succinctly, structural and rights-based principles are 
highly interrelated.118 Though conceptually simple, constitutional cohesion is 
non-intuitive in practice. Scholars, judges, policymakers, and others are quick 
to separate structural- and rights-based constitutional arguments when 
challenging varied laws.119 Federal laws attempting to classify persons in 
suspect ways are typically challenged on Equal Protection grounds. Federal laws 
impinging on state and local rights are countered with federalism-based 
arguments. To the degree these sensible arguments prevail, there is little need 
to go farther. However, linear challenges belie the notion that rights-based and 
structural approaches may present alternative, stronger options.
Constitutional cohesion is grounded in historical precedence. In Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts (1905), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an individual’s
challenge to state and local vaccination authorities framed largely in terms of 
due process and equal protection violations.120 Among the primary counter-
arguments proffered by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 
acknowledged by Justice Harlan in the Court’s Opinion were claims of 
federalism (i.e., the matter should be left to states to decide consistent with their 
sovereign authority) and separation of powers (i.e., courts must respect the 
legislative judgments of state and local governments in furtherance of the 
public’s health).121
Decades later in Morrison v. Olson (1988), the Court examined a statute that 
empowered a special three-judge panel to appoint an independent counsel to 
                                                                                                                     
116 James G. Hodge, Jr., Constitutional Cohesion and Public Health Promotion, 45 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 688, 689 (2017).
117 Id. at 690.
118 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 2, at 1516 (arguing that “protection of individual 
rights specifically, evenhanded treatment by the government, or ‘ordered liberty’ should 
be an explicit factor in the analysis of structural issues and should provide an animating 
principle for the jurisprudence of separated powers.”); see also TRIBE, supra note 6, at 124–
26 (“The separation of powers shapes not only topics that obviously implicate governmental 
structure or the allocation of power . . . but also issues . . . such as the values of fairness 
embodied in the law of due process.”).
119 See, e.g., Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1054 (2017) (“It is a 
theoretical mistake to cast rights and structure as conceptual opposites where rights serve 
functions similar to structure . . . [C]onstitutional theory . . . misses opportunities to examine 
how they fit into a coherent, harmonious whole.”).
120 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905).
121 HODGE, JR., supra note 10, at 69–71.
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investigate and prosecute crimes when certain executive officials came under 
suspicion.122 Separation of powers principles were implicated to the degree the 
statute empowered the judicial branch at the expense of the executive branch. 
The Court addressed the statute’s constitutionality by analyzing its effect on 
individuals’ due process rights. Since the statute guaranteed decision-makers 
would remain impartial, a core principle of due process, the Court dismissed any 
separation of powers concerns. In United States v. Lopez (1995), a minor faced 
federal criminal charges for possessing a gun at school in violation of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990.123 His attorneys looked beyond rights-based 
arguments to craft a successful federalism challenge to Congress’s commerce 
authority to implement the Act itself.124
In these and additional decisions, courts have recognized the 
interrelatedness of constitutional structural- and rights-based principles.125
Mere recognition, however, is not the end game. Litigants should increasingly 
frame constitutional challenges that reflect a cohesive view of constitutional 
principles. In the context of preemption+ strategies, litigants may need to couch 
alternative arguments to defeat legislative or regulatory attempts to tamp down 
local public health innovations through the guise of preemption in rights-based 
principles. 
In the aforementioned sanctuary cities challenge, San Francisco and Santa 
Clara successfully argued that the executive order was vague in violation of 
municipalities’ Fifth Amendment rights to due process.126 In Brnovich, Tucson 
could have similarly raised municipal due process concerns.127 This argument 
is complex and by no means assured victory. However, to the degree it presents 
rights-based challenges (e.g., due process) to structurally-grounded strategies 
(e.g., preemption), it may untangle invidious preemption+ tactics from settled 
constitutional doctrine to shed light on challenges with greater chances of 
triumph than linear structural or rights-based positions.
                                                                                                                     
122 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–61 (1988).
123 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
124 Id. at 567; see also HODGE, JR., supra note 10, at 31.
125 The premise that these arguments are best made or resolved within the judiciary is 
itself controversial. Some scholars argue that conflicts grounded in structural principles like 
separation of powers belong to Congress and the Executive Branch to resolve. Jesse Choper 
suggests that separation of powers issues are purely political and thus should not be subject 
to judicial review. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 100. Erwin Chemerinsky counters that 
“[t]he courts should be the authoritative arbiter of the entire Constitution.” Id. at 101.
126 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 534–40 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding 
that the executive order was “unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause” and “fail[ed] to provide [the counties] with procedural due process.”).
127 See Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 389, 395–96 (2013). 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Preemption+ strategies polarize local public health authorities and their 
communities from federal and state governments whose shared mission should 
be to fully protect the public’s health. These tactics defy conventional politics 
and threaten governmental stability in an era when traditional and emerging 
health threats are impacting local communities at alarming levels. Purported 
premises underlying preemption+ to bully localities into conformity or 
submission on key public health objectives inhibit local innovations at the heart 
of public health achievements regionally and nationally.
Battling these tactics entails a multi-faceted game plan centered on effective 
grass roots initiatives, political defenses of long-standing local public health 
authorities, and re-conceptualized legal challenges that embrace constitutional 
arguments outside the linear realm of traditional preemption approaches. 
Principles of constitutional cohesion suggest rights-based arguments may 
present an alternative framework to successfully challenge structurally-
grounded preemption+ measures. This approach requires litigants and courts to 
unravel plus strategies from their preemptive core. Resulting judicial reviews 
may shift away from losing arguments focused on structural foundations of 
preemption and toward rights-based norms. This shift may sustain more critical 
reviews initially and greater leverage subsequently for inventive interpretations 
of municipal and individual rights.

